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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Sections 78-2-2(3)0) and Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are raised on this appeal: 
1. Whether the ERISA Trust Funds, Union Plaintiffs and NECA 
Funds have standing to foreclose a mechanics lien and/or payment bond to 
recover employee benefit contributions, wage assessments, and industry 
fund contributions, under the Utah Mechanics Lien Act and Payment Bond 
Statute. This question of law is reviewable under the correction of error 
standard of review. Graco Fishing and Rental Tools v. Ironwood 
Exploration, 766 P,2d 1074 (Utah 1988). 
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2. Whether the claims asserted by the ERISA Trust Funds to 
recover contributions under the Utah Mechanics Lien Act and the Payment 
Bond Statute are preempted by ERISA. This question of law is reviewable 
under the correction of error standard of review. Graco Fishing and Rental 
Tools v. Ironwood Exploration. 766 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this case on September 17,2004. (R. 
1-31). The Complaint includes claims under the Utah Mechanics Lien Act 
and the Utah Payment Bond Statute, through which Plaintiffs seek to recover 
employee benefit contributions, working assessments, and industry fund 
contributions. 
Defendants Bovis Lend Lease, Inc. ("Bovis") and Travelers Casualty 
and Surety Company of America ("Travelers") filed an Answer on October 
21, 2004 (R. 52-60). 
Defendant Davis Hospital and Medical Center, Inc. ("Davis 
Hospital") filed an Answer on November 15,2004. (R. 61-67). 
On July 6, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, which 
corrected an error regarding the date upon which the last work was 
performed on the subject construction project. (R. 132-142). 
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Defendants Bovis and Travelers filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' First 
Amended Complaint on August 16,2005. (R. 190-198). 
On August 8,2006, Defendants Bovis and Travelers filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment, with supporting memorandum, against the 
ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs, and the NECA Funds, seeking 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims under the Utah Mechanics Lien Act, on the 
following grounds: 
(a) The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the 
NECA Funds do not have standing to assert claims under the Utah 
Mechanics Lien Act; 
(b) The mechanics lien claim of the ERISA Trust Funds is 
preempted by ERISA. (R. 295-716). 
On August 9, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment, and supporting memorandum seeking summary judgment in favor 
of Plaintiffs on the same issues that had been raised within Defendant Bovis 
and Traveler's motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 720-754). 
On August 29, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Defendant Bovis and Traveler's motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 
758-771). 
On August 29, 2006, Defendant Davis Hospital filed a memorandum 
in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. (R.772-
782). 
On August 29, 2006, Defendants Bovis and Travelers filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment. (R.783-799). 
On September 18,2006, Defendants Bovis and Travelers filed a reply 
memorandum in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 
804-819). 
On September 18,2006, Plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in 
support of their motion for partial summary judgment. (R.820-832). 
On February 14,2007, Defendant Davis Hospital filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment, with supporting memorandum, seeking dismissal 
of Plaintiffs' claims under the Utah Payment Bond Statute, on the same 
grounds as had previously been asserted by Defendants Bovis and Travelers 
in relation to Plaintiffs' claims under the Utah Mechanics Lien Act. (R. 875-
897). 
On February 27, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Defendant Davis Hospital's motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 915-
937). 
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On March 14,2007, Defendant Davis Hospital filed a reply 
memorandum in support of its motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 
948-959). 
On April 11,2007, the District Court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, which granted Defendants' motions for partial 
summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment. (R. 981-991). 
On May 9,2007, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Petition for Permission to 
Appeal Interlocutory Order. (R. 1001). 
On May 24,2007, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order 
granting Plaintiffs' Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. 
(R. 1005). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. For purposes of reference, the Plaintiffs in this case may be 
divided into the following categories: 
(a) Thirty-seven named individual Plaintiffs ("the individual 
Plaintiffs"), are workers who performed electrical work on the Davis 
Hospital Expansion Project ("the Project") during the time period of April 
2002 to approximately December 2003. The individual Plaintiffs seek to 
compel payments on their behalf from Defendants to the Plaintiff ERISA 
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Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs, and Plaintiff National Electrical 
Contractors' Association ("NECA"), in consideration for such work. 
(b) Plaintiffs Eighth District Electrical Benefit Fund, Eighth 
District Electrical Pension Fund Annuity Plan, National Electrical Benefit 
Fund, Intermountain NEC A and IBEW Vacation Trust Fund, IBEW Local 
Union 354 and Intermountain Chapter NEC A Retirement Benefit Fund, 
Joint Apprenticeship and Training Trust Fund, and Labor Management 
Cooperative Committee (the "ERISA Trust Funds"), are employee benefit 
plans established under and subject to the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 1001, et seq. Plaintiffs 
ERISA Trust Funds seek to recover employee benefit contributions from 
Defendants on behalf of the individual Plaintiffs for work performed on the 
Davis Hospital Expansion Project, 
(c) Plaintiffs Local Union 354 of the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("Local Union 354") and COPE Fund are 
collectively referred to herein as the "Union Plaintiffs." The Union 
Plaintiffs seek to recover wage assessments, on the part of Local Union 354, 
and contributions, on the part of the COPE Fund, from Defendants on behalf 
of the individual Plaintiffs for work performed on the Davis Hospital 
Expansion Project. 
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(d) Plaintiffs Administration Fee Fund and NECA Service 
Charge (collectively referred to herein as the "NECA Funds"), are Funds 
established and maintained by the National Electrical Contractors' 
Association ("NECA"). The NECA Funds seek to recover contributions 
from Defendants on behalf of the individual Plaintiffs for work performed 
on the Davis Hospital Expansion Project. (R. 721-722). 
2. During approximately early 2002, Defendant Davis Hospital 
and Medical Center ("Davis Hospital") contracted with Defendant Bovis 
Lend Lease, Inc. ("Bovis"), as a general contractor, to construct an 
expansion of the Davis Hospital in Layton, Utah (the "Project"). (R. 985). 
3. During approximately April of 2002, Bovis subcontracted with 
Western States Electric, Inc. ("WSE") to perform the electrical work on the 
Project. (R. 985). 
4. WSE was signatory to a Collective Bargaining Agreement 
("CBA") between the Union and NECA. Bovis and Davis Hospital were not 
signatory to the CBA. (R. 985). 
5. Under the terms of the CBA, WSE was required to pay 
contributions to the ERISA Trust Funds and the NECA Funds, and working 
assessments to the Union Plaintiffs, based upon the number of hours worked 
by each employee of WSE. (R. 724). 
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6. In accordance with the subcontract agreement between Bovis 
and WSE, the Union dispatched the individual Plaintiffs to perform 
electrical work on the Project, and the individual Plaintiffs performed such 
work. (R. 723-724). 
4. The electrical work performed by the individual Plaintiffs on 
the Project constituted an improvement to Defendant's real property. (R. 
724). 
7. Each of the individual Plaintiffs was a member of the Union 
during the time he or she performed work on the Project. (R. 724). 
9. The amounts claimed by Plaintiffs for vacation pay and 
working assessments were payroll deductions from the checks of the 
individual Plaintiffs. (R. 724). 
10. The Plaintiff NEC A Funds exist for the benefit of the individual 
Plaintiffs and other industry employees. (R. 725). 
11. WSE failed to pay the contributions and working assessments 
that were required under the CBA. (R. 724). WSE filed for Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy protection on July 22, 2003, in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Utah. (R. 725). 
12. On December 23, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Corrected Notice to 
Hold and Claim a Lien ("Notice of Lien") in the office of the Davis County 
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Recorder, pursuant to Utah Code Section 38-1-1 et seq. (R. 725). Through 
said Notice of Lien, Plaintiffs seek to establish a mechanics lien on the real 
property of Davis Hospital, upon which the individual Plaintiffs performed 
work on the Project, in the amount of the contributions and working 
assessments that WSE was required to pay under the CBA. 
13. On or about June 14, 2004, acting pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 38-1-28, Defendant Bovis, as Principal, and Defendant Travelers 
Casualty & Surety Company of America, as surety, executed a Bond to 
Release Mechanics' Lien. (R. 725). 
14. On or about June 21, 2004, acting pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 38-1-28, Defendant Davis Hospital executed a Notice of Release of 
Lien and Substitution of Alternate Security relating to Plaintiffs' Notice of 
Lien. (R. 725) 
15. On September 17, 2004, Plaintiffs filed this action to recover 
the unpaid employee benefit contributions, wage assessments and industry 
fund contributions under the Utah Mechanics Lien Act and/or the Utah 
Payment Bond Statute. (R. 1-31). 
16. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment relating to the following issues: 
(a) Whether the ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs 
and the NEC A Funds have standing to recover employee benefit 
contributions, wage assessments and/or industry fund contributions under 
the Utah Mechanics Lien Act or the Utah Payment Bond Statute; and 
(b) Whether the claims of the ERISA Trust Funds are 
preempted by ERISA. 
17. After briefing and oral argument, the District Court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law granting Defendants' motions for 
partial summary judgment on the grounds asserted by Defendants and 
denying Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 981-992). 
18. The claims of the individual Plaintiffs have not been 
determined and remain pending before the District Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Recovery of employee benefit contributions, wage assessments 
and industry fund contributions is consistent with the language and purpose 
of the Utah Mechanics Lien Act and the Utah Payment Bond Statute. The 
vast majority of courts in other states that have considered this issue have 
allowed such recovery. 
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2. The Utah Mechanics Lien Act and Utah Payment Bond Statute 
provide state law remedies of general application and are not preempted by 
ERISA. The vast majority of courts in other states that have considered this 
issue have found such claims not to be preempted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO RECOVER 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT CONTRIBUTIONS, WAGE 
ASSESSMENTS AND INDUSTRY FUND 
CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER THE UTAH MECHANICS LIEN 
AND PAYMENT BOND STATUTES. 
A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Pursue Their Claims Under The 
Utah Mechanics' Lien Act. 
Utah Code Section 38-1-3 of the Utah Mechanics' Lien Act ("the 
Act") states: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any 
services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment 
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who 
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, 
drawings, estimates of costs, surveys or superintendence, or 
who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed 
labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning 
which they have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished 
or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished 
or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
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owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred under 
Section 38-11-107 of the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such interest 
as the owner may have in the property. 
The primary purpose of the Act is to protect laborers who have added 
value to the property of others. Pearson v. Lamb, 121 P.2d 383 (Utah App. 
2005). The Act has been liberally construed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986). 
Utah Code Section 38-1-3 expressly permits a lien for the "value of 
the services rendered." The statute is not limited to wages. By any 
reasonable definition, the "value of services rendered" must include the 
benefit package that provides an integral part of the compensation received 
by employees for their work. 
Although the Utah courts have not specifically considered whether 
fringe benefit contributions, union dues or industry fund contributions are 
included within the "value of the service rendered" within the meaning of 
the Act, the courts of other states have held that such items are included 
under their mechanics' lien statutes. For example, in National Electrical 
Industry Fund, et al. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 463 A.2d 858 (Md. App. 
1983), the plaintiffs sought to enforce a mechanics' lien to collect 
contributions to employee benefit funds, industry funds, and union wage 
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assessments. The trial court initially dismissed the action on the grounds 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce a mechanics' lien under the 
applicable statutes. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, 
holding that the employee benefit funds had standing to enforce their 
mechanics' lien on behalf of their employee participants. The Court also 
held that the Union had standing to enforce its mechanics' lien based upon 
Federal labor law. With respect to the industry funds, the Court stated that 
an issue of fact existed with respect to their standing, but implied that the 
industry funds would have standing if they existed for the benefit of the 
employees. 
Similarly, in Connecticut Carpenters Benefit Funds v. Burkhard Hotel 
Partners, 849 A.2d 922 (Conn. App. 2004), the plaintiff sought to enforce a 
mechanics' lien to collect contributions to an employee benefit fund from a 
subcontractor. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint for failure to 
state a cause of action. In reversing that decision, the Connecticut Court of 
Appeals first considered whether the plaintiff had standing to enforce a 
mechanics' lien for employee benefit contributions. The Court reviewed the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Carter, 353 
U.S. 210 (1957), in which an employee benefit fund was allowed to collect 
upon a contractor's payment bond under the Miller Act. The Connecticut 
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Carpenters Court found the reasoning in Carter to be analogous to a case 
involving mechanics' liens, and held that the employee benefit fund had 
standing to enforce its mechanics' lien on behalf of its participating 
employees. In so holding, the Connecticut Carpenters Court quoted the 
following language from U.S. v. Carter: 
The trustees are claiming recovery for the sole benefit of the 
beneficiaries of the fund, and those beneficiaries are the very 
ones who have performed the labor. The contributions are the 
means by which the fund is maintained for the benefit of the 
employees and of other construction workers. For purposes of 
the Miller Act, these contributions are in substance as much 
"justly due" to the employees who have earned them as are the 
wages payable directly to them in cash. 353 U.S. at 220. 
The vast majority of states that have considered the issue have 
determined that employee benefit funds may enforce a mechanics' lien to 
collect contributions owed for work done by their participants. See, 
Performance Funding, L.L.C. v. Arizona Pipe Trade Trust Funds, 49 P.3d 
293 (Ariz. App.); Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan v. Children's Hospital, 
642 N.W. 2d 849 (Neb. App. 2002); Hawaii Laborers' Trust Funds v. Maui 
Prince Hotel 918 P.2d 1143 (Hawaii 1996); Plumber's Local 458 v. Howard 
Immel, Inc., 445 Nw.2d 43 (Wise. App. 1989); Divane v. Smith, 774 N.E. 
2d 361(111. App. 2002). 
Two states, Indiana and Florida, have held that employee benefit 
funds do not have standing to enforce mechanics' liens to collect employee 
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benefit contributions, based upon those states' strict construction of their 
mechanics' lien statutes. See Performance Funding, 49 P.3d at 298-299. 
However, even in those states, the individual employees have standing to 
enforce mechanics' liens for collection of their benefits. See Edward v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 517 N.E.2d 430 (Ind. App. 1988). 
B. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Pursue Their Claims Under The 
Utah Payment Bond Statute. 
Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their 
claims under the Utah Payment Bond Statute is based entirely upon the 
alleged similarity of Utah Payment Bond Statute to the Mechanic's Lien 
Act. Accordingly, if this Court should find that Plaintiffs have standing to 
pursue their claims under the Utah Mechanics Lien Act, a similar result with 
respect to the Payment Bond Statute is warranted. However, even if this 
Court rules that Plaintiffs lack standing under the Mechanics Lien Act, 
Plaintiffs should be allowed to pursue their claims under the Payment Bond 
Statute due to the overwhelming weight of authority that allows such claims. 
The Utah Courts have not directly determined whether a claim for 
employment-related benefits may be recovered under the Utah Payment 
Bond Statute. The Utah precedent that is most applicable to the present case 
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is Western Coating, Inc, v. Gibbons & Reed Company, 788 P.2d 503 (Utah 
1990). In Western Coating, a third tier supplier sought to recover upon a 
bond under the Utah Procurement Act, which contains language similar to 
the Payment Bond Statute. The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to 
recover due to the similarity of language and purpose between the Utah 
Procurement Act and the Mechanics' Lien Act. In rejecting this argument, 
the Utah Supreme Court relied upon federal precedents under the Miller Act. 
The Western Coating court provided a detailed discussion of the Utah. 
Procurement Act and its similarity to the Miller Act. 788 P.2d at 506. The 
court concluded: 
This Court has previously adopted federal interpretations for 
sections of the Utah Code which are identical to or copied after 
federal acts. When the legislature repealed the Little Miller Act 
in 1980 and replaced it with the Utah Procurement Code, the 
federal judicial interpretation of the Miller Act had been in 
place for 37 years. The legislature had the opportunity to 
affirmatively indicate that remote tier suppliers were covered by 
the Utah Procurement Code. Instead, it chose language which 
seems to codify the MacEvoy decision to limit public bond 
coverage to contractors, their subcontractors, and the next tier 
of suppliers. Id. (citations omitted). 
Western Coating establishes that federal precedents under the Miller 
Act provide persuasive authority in interpreting the provisions of the Utah 
Procurement Act, which contains language nearly identical to the language 
of the Utah Payment Bond Statute that is at issue in the present case. 
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Under the Miller Act, the federal courts have long recognized a cause 
of action on the part of employee benefit trust funds to recover contributions 
owed for benefits provided to workers. In United States v. Carter, 353 U.S. 
210 (1957), the United States Supreme Court allowed an employee benefit 
fund to collect upon a contractor's bond under the Miller Act. The 
Defendant surety in Carter argued that the trust funds were not entitled to 
recover on the bond because they had not provided labor or materials (which 
is the same argument Defendants make in the present case). The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument, holding that the trust funds effectively stood as 
assignees of the individual workers. 353 U.S. at 218-220. In so holding, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Whether the trustees of the fund are, in a technical sense, 
assignees of the employees' rights to the contributions need not 
be decided. Suffice it to say that the trustees' relationship to the 
employees, as established by the master labor agreements and 
the trust agreement, is closely analogous to that of an 
assignment. The master labor agreements not only created 
Carter's obligation to make the specified contributions, but 
simultaneously created the right of the trustees to collect those 
contributions on behalf of the employees. The trust agreement 
gave the trustees the exclusive right to enforce payment. The 
trustees stand in the shoes of the employees and are entitled to 
enforce their rights. 
Moreover, the trustees of the fund have an even better 
right to sue on the bond than does the usual assignee since they 
are not seeking to recover on their own account. The trustees 
are claiming recovery for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries of 
the fund, and those beneficiaries are the very ones who have 
performed the labor. The contributions are the means by which 
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the fund is maintained for the benefit of the employees and of 
other construction workers. For purposes of the Miller Act, 
these contributions are in substance as much "justly due" to the 
employees who have earned them as are the wages payable 
directly to them in cash. 353 U.S. at 219-220. 
Many federal and state courts have followed Carter in allowing 
employee benefit trust funds to recover unpaid contributions under 
contractor's bond statutes. Ragan v. Tri-Countv Excavating, 62 F.3d 501 (3rd 
Cir. 1995); Operating Engineers v. JWJ Contracting, 135 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 
1998); Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing, 68 F.3d 561 (2nd Cir. 1995); Trustees 
of Colo. Carp, v. Pinkard Construction. Co., 604 P.2d 683 (Colo. 1979); 
United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Arizona State Carpenters, 584 P.2d 
60 (Ariz. App. 1978); Indiana Carpenters v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 601 N.E.2d 
352 (Ind. App. 1992); Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan v. Children's 
Hospital, 642 N.W. 2d 849 (Neb. App. 2002); Divane v. Smith, 774 N.E. 2d 
361(111. App. 2002). 
Even jurisdictions that have denied recovery to employee benefit 
funds under mechanics' lien statutes have permitted such recovery under 
bond statutes. See Ridge Erection v. Mountain States T. & T., 549 P.2d 408 
(Colo. App. 1976)(plans had no standing under mechanics lien statute) and 
Trustees of Colo. Carp, v. Pinkard Construction. Co., 604 P.2d 683 (Colo. 
1979)(plans had standing under bond statute); Edward v. Bethlehem Steel 
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Corp., 517 N.E.2d 430 (Ind. App. 1988)(plans had no standing under 
mechanics' lien statute) and Indiana Carpenters v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 601 
N.E.2d 352 (Ind. App. 1992)(plans had standing under bond statute). 
To Plaintiffs' knowledge, there are no cases subsequent to U.S. v. 
Carter that have denied the standing of employee benefit plans to recover 
delinquent contributions under bond statutes. A few cases have denied such 
recovery due to ERISA preemption. However, the state statutes involved in 
those cases expressly referred to employee benefit funds, which is one of the 
grounds for preemption under New York State Conference of Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). See Chestnut-
Adams v. Bricklayers and Masons Trust Funds, 612 N.E.2d 236 (Mass. 
1993); Plumbing Industry Bd. v. E.W. Howell Co., 126 F.3d 61 (2nd Cir. 
1997). The Utah Payment Bond Statute does not expressly or implicitly 
refer to ERISA funds. It is a state law of general application, and is not 
preempted by ERISA. 
To Plaintiffs' knowledge, the only case that has denied recovery to 
employee benefit funds on the grounds of ERISA preemption, where the 
state statute at issue did not expressly refer to such funds, is I.B.E.W. v. 
Trig Electric Construction Co., 13 P.3d 622 (Wash. 2000). In so holding, 
the Trig Electric court relied heavily upon its previous decision to the same 
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effect in Puget Sound Elec. Workers v. Merit Co., 870 P.2d 960 (1994), and 
the doctrine of stare decisis. As noted by the dissenting opinion in Trig 
Electric, the majority failed to fully appreciate the substantial limitation 
upon ERISA preemption that had been established by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). Instead, the Trig Electric majority 
relied upon pre-Traveler precedents, including its own decision in Merit. 
The primary rationale for the majority's decision in Trig Electric is 
the fact that the plaintiffs sought recovery, via the contractors' bond statute, 
from a defendant that was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. 
However, at least three courts have relied upon that very fact in determining 
that such claims are not preempted. Ragan, 62 F.3d at 512-514; Oregon 
Steel Mills , 5 P.3d at 1130; Bellemead Dev. V. N.J. Council Carp. Ben 
Funds, 11 F.Supp.2d 500, 507-511 (D.N.J. 1998). 
II. PLAINTIFFS9 CLAIMS ARE NOT PREEMPTED BY ERISA. 
29 U.S.C. Section 1144(a) of ERISA states in relevant part: "[T]he 
provisions of this subchapter... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar 
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described 
in section 1003(a) of this title...." The issue of ERISA preemption is one 
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arising under Federal law. Mackev v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, 
Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988). 
From the inception of ERISA in 1974, the courts struggled in defining 
the scope of ERISA preemption. See Bellemead Dev. V. N.J. Council Carp. 
Ben Funds, 11 F.Supp.2d 500, 507-511 (D.NJ. 1998). 
The U.S. Supreme Court clarified and substantially limited the scope 
of ERISA preemption in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). In Travelers, a New 
York statute required hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered 
by commercial insurers. Several commercial insurers filed actions against 
the State, claiming that said statute "relates to" ERISA benefit plans and is 
preempted by Section 1144(a). The District Court and the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the New York statute was preempted. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts 
and rejected its holding in prior cases that ERISA preemption is to be 
construed broadly. Instead, the Travelers court established a presumption 
that ERISA is not intended to supplant state law. 514 U.S. at 654. Under 
Travelers, state laws are preempted by ERISA only where Congress has 
expressed a "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt such laws. Id. To 
overcome the presumption of non-preemption, a party challenging a state 
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statute must show that the statute operates in a manner that Congress 
intended ERISA to supersede. Bellemead, 11 F.Supp.2d at 509. 
Since Travelers, most of the courts that have considered the issue have 
held that state statutes creating mechanics' or contractors' liens are not 
preempted by ERISA. See Laborers' Trust Funds v. Maui Prince Hotel, 918 
P.2d 1143 (Haw. 1996); Trustees of Plumbers v. Farmington Cas., 33 
F.Supp.2d 904 (D. Or. 1998); Bellemead Dev. V. N.J. Council Carp. Ben 
Funds, 11 F.Supp.2d 500, 507-511 (D.N.J. 1998); I.B.E.W. v. Oregon Steel 
Mills, Inc., 5 P.3d 1122 (Ore. App. 2000). See also Plumbers' Local 458 v. 
H. Immel Ins., 445 N.W.2d 43 (Wis. App. 1989). Similarly, most courts 
have held that actions by ERISA benefit funds under contractors' bond 
statutes are not preempted. Ragan v. Tri-County Excavating, Inc., 62 F.3d 
501 (3rd Cir. 1995); Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing, 68 F.3d 561 (2nd Cir. 
1995); Operating Engineers v. JWJ Contracting, 135 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
These decisions have been based upon the fact that state mechanics' 
lien statutes are laws of general application, which often pre-date ERISA, 
and which contain no direct or necessary reference to ERISA. Further, the 
Congressional history relating to ERISA indicates Congress did not intend to 
supersede such laws. I.B.E.W. v. Oregon Steel Mills, Inc., 5 P.3d at 1130. 
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In the present case, Defendants have not asserted, much less 
demonstrated, that Congress intended to supercede the Utah Mechanics' 
Lien Act or Payment Bond Statute when it enacted ERISA. Instead, 
Defendants rely upon two court decisions that are of questionable validity. 
In I.B.E.W. v. Trig Electric Construction Co., 13 P.3d 622 (Wash. 
2000), the Washington Supreme Court held that an action brought by ERISA 
benefit funds to foreclose upon a contractor's bond was preempted by 
ERISA. In so holding, the Court relied heavily upon its previous opinion to 
the same effect in Puget Sound Elec. Workers v. Merit Co., 870 P.2d 960 
(1994), and the doctrine of stare decisis. As noted by the dissenting opinion 
in Trig Electric the majority failed to fully appreciate the substantial 
limitation upon ERISA preemption that had been established by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Travelers. Instead, the Trig Electric majority relied upon 
pre-Traveler precedents, including its own decision in Merit. 
The primary rationale for the majority's decision in Trig Electric is 
the fact that the plaintiffs sought recovery, via the contractors' bond statute, 
from a defendant that was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. 
Therefore, the Washington contractors' bond statute provided an "alternative 
remedy" that was preempted by ERISA. 13 P.2d at 628. However, the 
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majority provided no analysis of whether such "alternative remedy" 
conflicted with any provision of ERISA. 
The mere fact that a state statute creates a remedy that is not 
mentioned in ERISA does not render such statute preempted. For example, 
in Mackev v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 
(1988), a Georgia garnishment statute of general application was held not to 
be preempted by ERISA, even though it provided a remedy that was outside 
of ERISA's statutory framework. The Supreme Court based its decision, in 
part, upon the fact ERISA contains no provision for enforcing judgments. 
Therefore, state-law methods for collecting money judgments must remain 
undisturbed by ERISA. 486 U.S. at 834. 
If state law remedies for collecting judgments such as garnishment 
and attachment are not preempted by ERISA, it reasonably follows that 
other state law remedies for collecting money judgments, such as mechanics 
liens and payment bonds, are not preempted. 
The courts in Bellemead and Oregon Steel Mills expressly considered 
the argument that mechanics' lien statutes of general application are 
preempted by ERISA because they establish an alternative remedy. Both 
courts rejected this argument on the grounds that the parties against whom 
the mechanics' liens were asserted were not "employers" within the meaning 
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of ERISA. Bellemead, 11 F.Supp.2d at 515; Oregon Steel Mills, 5 P.3d at 
1130. Since ERISA contains no provision for collecting contributions from 
parties other than "employers," the state mechanics' lien statutes do not 
conflict with ERISA, and are not preempted. Notably, the fact that served as 
a basis for preemption in Trig Electric (i.e., that the liens were asserted 
against third parties), was relied upon by the Bellemead and Oregon Steel 
Mills courts to find no preemption. 
There is no evidence that Congress intended to supersede state 
mechanics' lien statutes or payment bond statutes when it enacted ERISA, or 
that such statutes conflict with any provision of ERISA. In the absence of 
such evidence, ERISA is presumed not to preempt Plaintiffs' mechanics' 
lien claim. 
In the District Court, Defendants cited Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone 
Star Industries, Inc. 982 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that 
ERISA preempts state laws that provide an alternative cause of action to 
employees to collect benefits protected by ERISA. However, Monarch 
Cement supports Plaintiffs' position, not Defendants' position. The state 
law contract claim in Monarch Cement was held not to be preempted by 
ERISA. In so holding, the Monarch Cement court stated as follows: 
Laws that have been ruled preempted are those that provide an 
alternative cause of action to employees to collect benefits protected 
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by ERISA, refer specifically to ERISA plans and apply solely to them, 
or interfere with the calculation of the benefits owed to an employee. 
Those that have not been preempted are laws of general application— 
often traditional exercises of state power or regulatory authority— 
whose effect on ERISA plans is incidental. Monarch Cement, 982 
F.2datl452. 
Applying these standards, the Monarch Cement Court held that the 
plaintiffs state law breach of contract claim was not preempted by ERISA, 
even though such claim raised the issue of who was liable for payment of 
ERISA plan benefits. 
Further, in reaching this conclusion, the Monarch Cement Court relied 
upon a prior decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Hospice of 
Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. Of Okla., Inc., 944 F.2d 752 (10th 
Cir. 1991). In Metro Denver, the Court held that an action brought by a 
group health care provider against an ERISA plan was not preempted by 
ERISA, concluding that "denying a third-party provider a state law claim 
based upon misrepresentation by the plan's insurer in no way furthers the 
purposes of ERISA." The Court's reasoning was based on the distinction 
between participant and non-participant suits, i.e., an action brought by a 
health care provider to recover promised payment from an insurance carrier 
is distinct from an action brought by a plan participant against the insurer 
seeking recovery of benefits due under the plan. Metro Denver, 944 F.2d at 
756. 
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In the present case, Plaintiffs' mechanics' lien action does not fit any 
of the categories for preemption set forth in Monarch Cement. This is not an 
action by employees to collect benefits protected by ERISA, but rather an 
action to collect contributions owed to the plans on behalf of the employees. 
Further, the distinction within Metro Denver between actions brought by 
participants and non-participants is similar to the distinction that has been 
made by other courts, in holding that mechanics' lien claims are not 
preempted by ERISA, on the grounds that such claims are not asserted 
against "employers" within the meaning of ERISA. See Bellemead Dev. V. 
N.J. Council Carp. Ben Funds, 11 F.Supp.2d 500, 515 (D.N.J. 1998); 
I.B.E.W. v. Oregon Steel Mills, Inc., 5 P.3d 1122, 1130 (Ore. App. 2000). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and arguments, Plaintiffs 
request that the decision of the District Court in this case be reversed, and 
that this case be remanded to the District Court with a direction to enter 
partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the issue of their standing 
under the Utah Mechanics Lien Act and Payment Bond Statute, and the issue 
of ERISA preemption. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ b day of July, 2007. 
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Respectfully submitted this Lk day of July, 2007. 
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The above-captioned matter came before the Honorable Judge Thomas L. Kay 
on October 24, 2006, for oral argument of the parties' cross motions for partial summary 
judgment. Defendants Bovis Lend Lease, Inc. ("Bovis") and Travelers Surety Company 
of America, Inc. ("Travelers") were represented by Brian J. Babcock and Jason H. 
Robinson of Babcock Scott & Babcock, P.C. Defendant Bovis was further represented 
by Cecil R. Hedger. Defendant Davis Hospital and Medical Center, LP ("Davis 
Hospital") was represented by Robert R. Harrison of Snow Christensen & Martineau. 
Bovis, Travelers and Davis Hospital may be collectively referred to as "Defendants". 
Plaintiffs were represented by Richard W. Perkins and Kenneth B. Grimes. The 
Plaintiffs, for the purpose of these Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, are 
organized into the following four categories: (1) Troy Forsberg, Robert Nicholls, 
Timothy McGuire, Leslie Oveson, Dennis Shelton, Michael Gizzi, Merlin Bateman, 
Frank Knaus, Joy Watkins, Fred Hansen, Ronald Deppe, Greg Keller, Jason 
Lambourne, Jerry Bowman, Michael Caldwell, Harold Dupaix, Shawn Shaw, Jack 
Abbott, Toby Winters, Aaron Gaines, Kepper Kennedy, Edward Meyer, Brandon Miller, 
Wayne Derbidge, James Winterbottom, Bryan Stoddard, Michael White, Justin 
Christensen, Paul Knorr, Marita Stoneking, Viktor Sidenko, John Gualtier, Leon 
Nordfors, Lew Kelso, Kenneth Trujillo, John Openshaw, Cory Olsen (the "Individual 
Plaintiffs"); (2) Eighth District Electrical Benefit Fund, Eighth District Electrical Pension 
Fund Annuity Plan, National Electrical Benefit Fund, Intermountain NECA and IBEW 
Vacation Trust Fund, IBEW Local Union 354 and Intermountain NECA and IBEW 
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Vacation Trust Fund, IBEW Local Union 354 and Intermountain Chapter NECA 
Retirement Benefit Fund, Joint Apprenticeship and Training Trust Fund, and Labor 
Management Cooperative Committee (the "ERISA Trust Funds"); (3) Local Union 354 
of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the "Union") and COPE Fund 
(collectively, the "Union Plaintiffs"); (4) Administration Fee Fund, and NECA Service 
Charge (collectively, the "NECA Funds"). 
Based upon the memoranda filed by the various parties and the oral arguments 
presented, the Court grants Defendants1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Further, the Court makes the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about June 1, 1994, the Union and Intermountain Chapter of the 
National Electrical Contractors Association, Inc. ("NECA") executed the "Agreement and 
Declaration of Trust of the Intermountain Chapter NECA/IBEW Local 354 Labor 
Management Cooperation Committee." 
2. On or about March 1, 1997, the Union and NECA executed the 
"Agreement and Declaration of Trust of the I.B.E.W. Local Union 354 and Intermountain 
Chapter NECA Retirement Benefit Fund." 
3. On or about March 9, 1999, the Union and NECA executed the "Restated 
Agreement and Declaration of Trust of the Intermountain NECA and IBEW Vacation 
Trust Fund." 
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4. On or about February 28, 2001, the Board of Trustees of the Eighth 
District Electrical Pension Trust Agreement executed the "Trust Agreement Governing 
the Eighth District Electrical Pension Trust." 
5. On or about June 1, 2001, the trustees of the Eighth District Electrical 
Benefit Fund executed the Trust Agreement Governing the Eighth District Electrical 
Benefit Fund." 
6. On or about June 1, 2000, NECA executed the "Inside Wireman 
Agreement," which both parties renewed on two subsequent occasions, making the two 
parties bound to one another by its terms until May 31, 2005. 
7. Western States Electric, Inc. ("WSE") had previously assented to and 
become bound by the "Inside Wireman Agreement" (the collective bargaining 
agreement) between NECA and the Union by executing the "Letter of Assent-A" on 
December 1, 1983. 
8. The Defendants were not signatory to nor a party to any agreement with 
the Plaintiffs. 
9. The Davis Hospital contracted with Bovis, as a general contractor, to 
construct the expansion of the Davis Hospital in Layton, Utah (the "Project"). 
10. At all times material to this action, Davis Hospital was the record owner of 
the real property upon which the Project was constructed. 
11. In or about April 2002, Bovis subcontracted with WSE to perform certain 
electrical work on the Project. 
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12. In or about April 2002, the Union dispatched some of its members to work 
as employees of WSE to provide labor on the Project. 
13. WSE had a history of being delinquent on making benefit contributions 
and accordingly, on August 26, 2002, the trustees of the Intermountain NECA and 
IBEW Vacation Trust Fund, IBEW Local Union 354 and Intermountain Chapter NECA 
Retirement Benefit Fund, Joint Apprenticeship and Training Trust Fund, Labor-
Management Cooperative Committee, Cope Fund, Administrative Fee Fund, NECA 
Service Charge, and the Union filed a lawsuit against WSE, pursuant to ERISA, seeking 
payment of delinquent trust fund contributions through June, 2002, and obtained a 
judgment against WSE. 
14. Pursuant to the ERISA judgment, the Trustees and the Union obtained a 
"Writ of Garnishment," dated January 21, 2003, which required Bovis to withhold 
$49,024.09 from Western States' earnings from its work on the Project. 
15. Pursuant to this "Writ of Garnishment," the Trustees and the court issued 
a "Garnishee Order," dated April 8, 2003, requiring Bovis to pay $49,024.09 to Attorney 
Richard W. Perkins to the benefit of the Trustees. 
16. In compliance with the Order, Bovis issued payment to Richard W. Perkins 
on April 14, 2003. 
17. This payment was then credited to WSE's contributions that were the most 
delinquent. None of these outstanding contributions paid related to the wages earned 
for work performed on the Project. 
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18. Despite its knowledge of WSE's continual delinquency regarding trust fund 
contributions, the Union continued dispatching workers to WSE to perform labor on the 
Project, did not get a surety bond from WSE as required by the above-referenced 
"Inside Wireman Agreement," and did not terminate their agreement with WSE. 
19. The Individual Plaintiffs who performed electrical work on the Project were 
paid by WSE their full hourly wages for their services provided. 
20. The ERISA Trust Funds did not perform any labor and/or services nor did 
they provide any materials for the improvement of the property at the Project. 
21. The Union Plaintiffs did not perform any labor and/or services nor did they 
provide any materials for the improvement of the property at the Project. 
22. The NECA Funds did not perform any labor and/or services nor did they 
provide any materials for the improvement of the property at the Project. 
23. The ERISA Trust Funds, Union Plaintiffs and NECA Funds claim that 
WSE failed to pay the full amount of contributions and working assessments required 
under the collective bargaining agreement or other labor agreements they had with 
WSE. 
24. WSE filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on or about July 22, 2003, in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, Petition No. 03-32610. 
25. On or about December 23, 2003, Plaintiffs, including the ERISA Trust 
Funds, Union Plaintiffs and NECA Funds, filed a "Corrected Notice to Hold and Claim a 
Lien" against the Project. 
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26. Thereafter, pursuant to Utah Code Section 38-1-28, Bovis and Travelers 
executed a "Bond to Release Mechanic's Lien," dated June 14, 2004. 
27. Thereafter, pursuant to Utah Code Section 38-1-28, Defendants filed a 
"Notice of Release of Lien and Substitution of Alternate Security," dated June 21, 2004, 
which was recorded in the Office of the Davis County Recorder on June 28, 2004. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds are not 
listed as persons entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 of Utah's Mechanic's Lien 
Statute. 
2. The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds are not 
listed as persons entitled to recovery under Section 14-2-1 (3)(a) of the Utah 
Contractors' Bond Statute. 
3. The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds do not 
fall within the class of individuals or entities the Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute are 
designed to protect. 
4. The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds do not 
fall within the class of individuals or entities the Utah Contractors' Bond statutes are 
designed to protect. 
5. The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds are not 
entitled to file a lien pursuant to Section 38-1-3 of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
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6. The services covered by the Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute apply only to 
those utilized in the actual physical improvement of specific property. 
7. The services covered by the Utah's Contractors' Bonds Statute apply only 
to those utilized in the actual physical improvement of specific property. 
8. The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds did not 
provide any services which added value of the Project under the Utah Mechanic's Lien 
Statute. 
9. The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds did not 
provide any services which added value of the Project under the Utah Contractors' 
Bond Statute. 
10. The alleged unpaid contributions and assessments are not considered 
part of the wages of the Individual Plaintiffs. 
11. The benefits, if any, provided by the ERISA Trust Funds, the Union 
Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds are general and remote in nature and do not specifically 
relate to the Project. 
12. The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds' lien 
claims and claims against the Bond to Release Mechanic's Lien are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
13. The ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds' claims 
under the Contractors' Bond Statute are dismissed with prejudice. 
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14. The ERISA Trust, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds do not have 
standing to sue the Defendants for unpaid contributions and assessments. 
15. The unpaid contributions and assessments claimed by the ERISA Trust 
Fund, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA Funds are not wages. 
16. The ERISA Trust claims "relate to" the enforcement of an employee 
benefit plan created under ERISA. 
17. The ERISA Trust claim under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute would create 
a new substantive claim which is prohibited by ERISA. 
18. The ERISA Trust claims under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute would 
provide an alternate enforcement mechanism which is prohibited by ERISA. 
19. The ERISA Trust claims under the Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute are 
prohibited by the exclusive remedies provided by ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. 
20. The allowance of the ERISA Trust claims would obligate or impose liability 
upon third parties to fund ERISA plans who were not parties to the underlying collective 
bargaining agreements which is prohibited by ERISA. 
21. The ERISA Trust claims are preempted by ERISA and the claims are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
22. Defendants are the "successful party" to this action and are entitled to an 
award against Plaintiffs for their court costs and attorney fees incurred in this action 
pursuant to Section 38-1-18 of the Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute and Section 14-2-
2(3) of the Utah Contractors' Bond Statute. 
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ii^Vof, DATED as of this l A ^ day of April, 2007. 
By the Court: 
Approved as to Form: 
Dated this ^ day of April, 2007. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
(Robert R. Harrison, Esq. / 
Attorney for Defendant Davis Hospital 
Dated this _£ day of April, 2007. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
By ' \\Z^o\yy\ 'susrwidr-
Richard W. Perkins,VbSq 
Kenneth B. Grimes, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
<71/wiA 
The Honorable, J u d ^ i t r ^ r i a s L, Kay 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of April, 2007 I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following by depositing copies 
thereof in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Richard W. Perkins, Esq. 
Kenneth B. Grimes, Esq. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
4885 South 900 East, Suite 211 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert R. Harrison, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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